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Abstract 
Offshore outsourcing of business activities from the Global North to the Global South does 
not only relocate investments and jobs, but has also brought about new business demands on 
suppliers activities and their social and environmental impact. The article explores whether, 
how and why offshore outsourcing transactions between foreign firms and Malaysian firms 
affect the upgrading of the CSR activities of Malaysia incorporated firms, taking the 
particular institutional context of Malaysia into consideration. The focus is on recipient 
country vendors, contract manufacturers or subcontractors and their reception of and 
strategising about corporate social responsibility. The findings of the study indicate, firstly, 
that the amount of foreign (sub)contracting influences the CSR strategising of domestic firms 
while the global value chain position is only conditioning the offshore outsourcing portfolio. 
Secondly, both the corporate governance of Malaysian affiliate and the Malaysian 
government play an important role shaping the perception, rhetoric and organisation of CSR 
activities by firms in Malaysia with a domestic value chain position. Hence, firms in Malaysia 
are squeezed by international business linkages and the local institutional context. 
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1. Introduction 
In the Global North, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been conceived as a 
voluntary and corporate-driven agenda. The CSR agenda is seen as aiming to fill the vacuum 
in international business regulation following from the globalisation of economic activities 
and the liberalisation and deregulation of economies in favour of the liberal market 
mechanisms (Pedersen 2006). Yet, the business community has not been the sole agent in the 
‘market of virtue’ (Vogel 2004). Civil society organisations have played a prominent role in 
consumer activism, environmental movements, anti-sweatshop campaigns, and fair trade 
initiatives. Instead of corporate social responsibility, the NGO agenda has been articulated as 
‘corporate social accountability’ emphasising the rights of consumers, employees, and 
citizens around the world and the duty of TNCs to comply with these rights.  
    However, in developing countries the CSR agenda is different from the North because, as 
argued by Prieto-Carrón et.al. (2006), in the North the challenge is to move beyond the 
existing legislation, while the CSR challenge in the South is to make firms comply with the 
legislation. However, such an assessment assumes that the state is weak and incapable of 
enforcing its own legislation while the Northern states are able to secure compliance with 
their tougher legislation. This premise may be right in many countries, but its assumption that 
the state is weak and even on retreat may not be the case in all developing countries (Weiss 
2003). In fact, the reverse case seems to evolve in Malaysia, where state agencies seem once 
again to play a crucial role in adopting and transforming the CSR discourse in line with the 
development strategy of the state and the interests of the government. Neither local firms, nor 
local civil society groups may have the interests or courage or capabilities to further the CSR 
agenda beyond the policies of the government.  
    In a seven-country study of CSR web site reporting in Asia, including Malaysia, Chapple 
and Moon (2005) conclude that “multinational companies are more likely to adopt CSR than 
those operating solely in their home country but that the profile of their CSR tends to reflect 
the profile of the country of operation rather than the country of origin” (op.cit. 415). 
However, they acknowledge that sector varieties may explain their findings, and that public 
policy on corporate governance may also influence the evolution of the CSR agenda. 
Moreover, cross-border multi-cultural conditions and micro-level strategies of management 
may impact on CSR conceptions and practices. Overall, Chapple and Moon designate the 
interplay between globalisation, national business systems and domestic CSR profiles to be a 
knowledge gap and a research topic.  
        In order to explore international and domestic drivers of enterprise-level CSR 
perceptions and institutions, the article will undertake an analysis of the emergence of the 
CSR agenda in Malaysia in the perspective of offshore outsourcing of production and services 
from the North to the South. For Malaysia, an industrialising country in transition from a 
labour intensive to a technology intensive economy, Northern offshoring and/or outsourcing 
has played a crucial role in a deliberate government strategy of catching up; and with the rise 
of the corporate governance agenda after the financial crisis 1997-98, corporate social 
responsibility was easily added. More specifically, the objective of the discussion paper is to 
explore whether, how and why the inter-firm dynamics of offshore outsourcing transactions 
between foreign firms and Malaysian firms (indigenous or domestic) affect the upgrading of 
the CSR activities of Malaysia incorporated firms, taking the particular institutional context 
of Malaysia into consideration. 
    The focus is on recipient country vendors, contract manufacturers or subcontractors and 
their reception of, strategising about and organisational adoption of corporate social 
responsibility activities. The hypotheses are, firstly, that the responsiveness of Malaysian 
firms depends on the nature of their global value chain (GVC), that buyer-driven value chains 
elicit such responses while producer-driven value chains do not. Secondly, that recipient 
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country firms are responding re-actively and not pro-actively to foreign CSR demands, if they 
are responding at all. However, the findings of the study indicate, firstly, that the amount of 
foreign (sub-) contracting influences the CSR strategising of domestic firms while the global 
value chain position is only conditioning the offshore outsourcing portfolio. Secondly, that 
both the corporate governance of Malaysian affiliate and the Malaysian government play an 
important role shaping the perception, rhetoric and organisation of CSR activities by firms in 
Malaysia with a domestic value chain position. Hence, firms in Malaysia are squeezed by 
international business linkages and the local institutional context. 
    The paper is structured in the following way: Section two shortly outlines the methodology 
applied in the article. Section three elaborates and deliberates on relevant theoretical 
approaches and the analytical framework applied. Section four locates the micro-level and 
business discussion in the institutional environment and not least political initiatives that have 
facilitated the emergence of a CSR debate and agenda in Malaysia. In section five the 
empirical data about nine firms with operations in Malaysia are analysed and the interplay 
between offshore outsourcing and CSR is discussed. Section six winds up the analysis and 
concludes the argumentation.  
 
2. Methodology  
The study was framed in a GVC perspective, taking CSR to be a new and emerging quality 
standard developed by chain leading firms in the North, and applied as pre-qualification 
standard for suppliers in developing countries (see section 4). Hence, the working hypotheses 
was that CSR issues were raised by Northern customers and especially principal firms located 
in buyer driven GVCs, while CSR was given less attention by chain leaders in producer-
driven GVCs. At the recipient end, developing country firms were supposed to take a re-
active strategy toward CSR and otherwise neglect the CSR discourse perceived as a Northern 
agenda. 
    The literature review on the CSR discourse in Malaysia and CSR-oriented social research 
disclosed that a CSR agenda was emerging especially after the East Asian financial crisis, and 
that the government and government-linked institutions and corporations seemed to promote 
the CSR agenda. Yet, corporate social involvement, social reporting, and social performance 
had also been issues of the past (Teoh and Thong, 1981; Teoh and Thong, 1986; Abdul 
Rashid and Abdullah, 1991; Abdul Rashid and Ibrahim, 2002). More recently, surveys of 
CSR attributes of Malaysian companies have been conducted by ACCA (Tay 2006), Amran 
(2006), Business Ethics Institute of Malaysia (New Straits Times, April 2006) and Ramasamy 
and Hung (2004), while Zulkifli & Amran (2006) undertook a small interview based and 
qualitative investigation of the CSR awareness of accounting professionals. Even 
international surveys have been undertaken based on investigation of corporate websites 
(Chapple & Moon 2005) or written policies of large corporations (Welford 2005). However, 
few case studies have been conducted, and they were directed towards foreign TNCs like 
Swedish SKF with manufacturing operations in Malaysia (Johansson, E. & Larsson, P. 2000). 
No published case-oriented field studies of locally owned Malaysian companies had been 
identified. Hence, an explorative type of a multiple case studies was appropriate. 
    The identification, selection, and accession of Malaysian companies posed the biggest 
problem. No public register of Malaysian firms contracting or subcontracting business 
activities from Northern firms was available, and the same was the case regarding Malaysian 
firms with a CSR profile. We decided to establish two classes of manufacturing firms, 
acknowledging the dual angles and potential drivers of the offshore outsourcing (OO)-CSR 
nexus: OO influencing CSR, and CSR influencing OO.  
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    The first class of firms comprised known companies with domestic offshore and/or 
outsourcing activities in Malaysia, including foreign owned as well as joint ventures and 
locally owned firms. The second class of firms included domestically based firms with a 
published record of CSR activities, based on the ACCA annual contest on corporate social 
and environmental reporting in 2005 (ACCA’s Malaysia Environmental and Social Reporting 
Awards (MESRA) 2005, report of the judges). The two lists contained foreign, JVs and local 
firms spread all over the country and we decided to go for domestically incorporated firms 
located in and around the capital, Kuala Lumpur, and the Klang Valley. Having identified 
local firms with either a subcontracting activity or a CSR profile, we had to work hard to get 
access and interviews. In several cases, firms declined to participate, apologising for not 
having time due to finalising annual accounts etc. In some cases, firms preferred a telephone 
interview, and in other cases firms volunteered to answer a questionnaire.  
    We ended up with nine completely covered firms of which three were selected based on the 
ACCA list (CSR profile) in addition to one firm identified from a newspaper article about its 
environmental engagement. The five other firms were part of the supplier list. A last (10th) 
firm was selected because it had one of the two Malaysia-based UN Global Compact firms 
among its affiliated companies. A few companies were approached based on former research 
contacts. In sum, we obtained access to a small theoretically sampled set of manufacturing 
firms, which varied across several industries (from food over chemical and pharmaceutical to 
electronics and automobile component suppliers). Such a multiple case sample can be used to 
analyse similarities and differences between multiple configurations of OO and CSR 
properties of particular Malaysian manufacturing firms (Ragin 1987). Yet, all but one firm 
belonged to the category of large firms if the cut-off point of SMEs is set below 250 
employees. 
    The data obtained from the case firms do not match a real case study - understood as 
research which provides a detailed picture of the structure and dynamics of the firm in its real 
surroundings. Only one interview was undertaken and often with the person in charge of CSR 
or in a higher executive position. Additional data were provided (company reports, booklets 
etc.) by the respondents or retrieved from company web pages, press reports etc. No factory 
visits were carried out in any case. So the material is very much data which disclose how 
executives perceive of and understand the CSR problem area while they are treated as 
representatives of the company concerned.  Such data may picture the subjective world of the 
company officers but not articulate a more complex and diverse understanding of the 
company situation and change. 
    The data are finally classified and analysed in a theoretical framework which has been 
modified according to field experiences and data accessibility. The key concern is to secure 
the multi-dimensional complexity of the problem area by way of establishing the particular 
configuration of the specific firm, thereby enabling comparison between firms and groups of 
firms. These comparisons can then be used to test hypotheses about offshore outsourcing and 
CSR in Malaysian businesses, and/or build new hypotheses and explanations of the OO-CSR 
nexus. The premises of the analysis are laid down by the construed, modified, and applied 
theoretical framework.  
    Finally, a few interviews were made with representatives from Malaysian institutions and 
organisations which appeared to relate to the emerging CSR agenda, e.g. the Security 
Commission, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE)/Bursa Malaysia (which in fact also 
was a company) and the ACCA organisation. Moreover, interviews were undertaken with the 
Malaysian Automotive Association (MAA), as some case firms operated in the automotive 
sector, the National Union of Transport Equipment and Allied Industries Workers 
(NUTEAIW), and the Malaysian Trades Union Congress (MTUC). The Federation of 
Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) declined an interview.     
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3. Theoretical framework 
One of the main contributing factors to the debate of CSR has been the lack of consensus on 
what the concept really meant. Some definitions deal with the issue of what range of 
economic, legal or voluntary matters fall under the purview of a firm’s social responsibilities; 
other definitions attempt to identify the social issues for which the firm has a responsibility, 
such as occupational health and safety, environmental protection, and discrimination; another 
group of definitions is more concerned about the manner of the response to social issues 
rather than with the kind of issues that are to be addressed. Carroll (1979) and Strand (1983) 
have attempted to build conceptual frameworks of corporate performance to clarify and 
integrate all these distinctive definitions of CSR, based on an accepted theoretical paradigm of 
stimulus-processing-response.  
    Nevertheless, it remains a very debated and unsettled issue whether progressive CSR 
policies and practices correspond or cause higher profitability and business performance in a 
wider sense. Vogel (2005) argues that research is rather inconclusive on the matter of CSR’s 
effect on business performance. Moskowitz (1972) sees a socially responsible firm as having 
minimal explicit CSR costs but enjoying derived implicit benefits such as high staff morale 
and improved productivity, whereas Vance (1975) argues that a firm that incurs costs on its 
social responsibility initiative is at an economic disadvantage compared to another firm that is 
less responsible. A third argument is that, although the CSR costs are significant, they will be 
offset by reduction in other operating costs, such as a firm that is responsible to its staff’s 
health and safety seeing a decrease in its other explicit operating costs such as production 
delays, absenteeism and breakdowns (Cornell & Shapiro, 1987). The last perspective argues 
that CSR serves as an indication of the management skills for the stakeholders; for instance, 
adopting a CSR agenda will provide a good image to the firm’s management and eventually 
will result in a decrease in costly explicit claims by the stakeholders (Alexander and Bucholtz, 
1978). 
    In a development perspective, Prieto-Carrón et.al. (2006) contend that the literature is quite 
biased in favour of CSR’s profit-enhancing effects and positive benefits for multiple 
stakeholders, while CSR interventions in the South may as well impact negatively on 
populations in developing countries. Hence, the research agenda is in need of critical studies 
that look at impact in a power, class, and gender perspective while contextualising the 
understanding of CSR dynamics. In the case of Malaysia, Loh undertook a survey among 
publicly listed companies of the KLSE/Bursa Malaysia, and although his main focus was on 
corporate governance, he concluded that ethical business practices correlated both with good 
business leadership and good corporate governance, and also with good financial performance 
during the 1990s (Loh, 2006:235).  
    Pursuing the critical CSR & development agenda lining CSR to poverty alleviation, Newell 
& Frynas (2007:670) contend that we have to differentiate between business-as-usual and 
business-as-CSR, that is, CSR as a business tool, and CSR as a development tool. The authors 
state that the pertinent questions are: “how, when and through what means business can help 
to reduce poverty, while recognising the equally powerful potential of the business 
community to exacerbate poverty” (Newell & Frynas 2007:672). 
    Yet, it makes less sense to do impact studies if we are ignorant about the motives, the 
content and the process by which CSR initiatives are generated and implemented. The critical 
complexity starts with the variety of motives behind CSR strategies, policies, and practices, 
be they cost oriented, investment oriented or more ethically or morally founded. Moreover, 
articulated motives may also be influenced by the actual performance of the company in the 
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sense that CSR practices may be upgraded when the firm makes a satisfactory (or increased) 
profit or turnover.  
    However, taking a Global Value Chain (GVC) perspective on the OO-CSR problem area 
implies that an inter-firm level of analysis takes priority both for the individual (intentional) 
level and for the contextual institutional analysis, although there are calls for a more balanced 
approach regarding the political economic context and structure vis-à-vis the global value 
chain (Bair 2005).  
    When the principal OO firms subscribe to CSR codes of conduct in their OO activities they 
add new knowledge and information requirements and raise the demands to upstream 
suppliers, downstream buyers/dealers, and logistic/transporting firms. Hence, in a GVC 
perspective the OO-CSR nexus can be analysed as two interlinked sets of transactions where 
each can be described in accordance with three dimensions of business transactions: 
‘complexity’, ‘codifiability’, and supplier ‘capability’ (Gereffi et. al. 2005). The configuration 
of these properties is taken to explain the type of governance practice and, by implication, the 
space for local firms to upgrade in terms of market position, product quality, process 
efficiency, functional assignments, and alternative value chains.  
    Adding the institutional context, which provides for both information and knowledge spill 
over as well as for collective action and, hence, for some kind of ‘collective efficiency’, new 
explanatory factors are to be included. Moreover, the question of strategy and capability of 
the principal OO firm is not made explicit in the GVC framework, presuming probably that 
the principal OO firms possess high capability and decide the most appropriate type of 
governance in accordance with the transactional complexity and codifiability, and the 
capability of the supplier firm (Wad forthcoming). But in a developing country context 
principal OO firms do not by necessity possess high capability vis-à-vis the transaction 
concerned, and as such it is a matter of empirical investigation. Hence, both the principal and 
the recipient OO firm could pursue an offensive/proactive strategy or defensive/reactive 
strategy in order to improve its competitive position in a GVC perspective - 
offensive/proactive by way of CSR upgrading ahead of competitors, or defensive/reactive by 
complying with CSR requirements when they become obligatory or otherwise evading CSR 
claims by way of offshore outsourcing to non-CSR embedded locations (Rasiah, personal 
communication 2006). 
    The lead firm-contracting firm relationship can be understood using the principal-agent 
analysis. Agency theory assumes that individuals are self-interest creatures. In order to avoid 
opportunism, it is necessary to provide the agent with incentives to act in accordance with the 
principal’s interests. This can be done either by monitoring behaviour or rewarding outcomes. 
From a global value chain perspective, the lead firm secures compliance with the offshore 
outsourcing cum CSR contract through monitoring and sanctioning against non-compliance 
(opportunism). Opportunism in relation to codes of conduct and other CSR standards 
becomes relevant due to the fact that these initiatives can be costly and time consuming. 
    Opportunism can easily be dealt with if the codes of conduct include all contingencies. 
However, most codes of conduct are incomplete, lack efficient monitoring systems, display 
ambiguous and non-specific intent and purpose. Therefore, the potential conflict of interest 
between the companies and the incomplete nature of codes of conduct make it relevant for the 
initiator of the codes of conduct (i.e. the lead firm) to safeguard from non-compliance on part 
of its contractor. Safeguards, or protective mechanisms, are basically means to ensure that an 
agent fulfils his or her obligations according to the agreement (Koch, 1995). 
   Pedersen (2004) discusses six safeguards for securing compliance with codes of conduct in 
global supply chains which all apply to OO cum CSR activities in GVCs: Direct sanctions; 
goal congruence; third party intervention; trust; and reputation effects. These mechanisms can 
be related to the GVC types of governance. Direct sanction (e.g. termination of contract) 
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depends on the interdependence of the OO firm and the contractor and will be more effective 
in market based and captive governance, but may transform the transaction into onshore in-
sourcing if no alternative contractors are available offshore and onshore (hierarchy 
governance). Generating goal congruence may be one of the most effective ways of reducing 
or eliminating opportunism, but also quite expensive requiring joint investment, training and 
technical support, and long-term contracts (applicable in captive, relational, modular types of 
governance). Trust is a safeguard being based on long term interaction and learning and, 
hence, more relevant in lasting relationships than in new relationships (especially relevant in 
relational type of governance). Third party interventions (TPI) can sustain the overall 
credibility of the CSR code and its implementation and, hence, secure compliance and avoid 
opportunism; and TRI is applicable in all types of governance. Reputation effects (RE) 
safeguard the OO firm where the contractor is dependent on the principal firm and also 
dependent on a business network to sustain its performance and financial viability (overall 
transaction pattern of contractor). 
    Both governance and safeguards of implementation deal with transactional aspects between 
business parties. What is missing here is on the one hand the wider business context which 
impacts on the individual firms and their bilateral transactions, and on the other hand the way 
that the principal and recipient firms organise their CSR activities. However, the study 
abstains from analysing of both sides of the transaction and concentrates on the recipient 
(agent) firm in the OO relationship, while it includes the business context2 and the internal 
organisation of CSR activities3. In sum, the theoretical framework for analysing the interface 
between OO transactions and CSR upgrading of Malaysian firms (table 1 below) is construed 
as an integration of the corresponding frameworks for core business transactions and CSR 
transactions respectively. 
 
Table 1: Combined GVC+ analysis of governance & upgrading of vendor  firms’ core & CSR  activities. 
Principal 
OO firm 
general 
capability 
Recipient 
DC firm 
general 
capability 
Complexity of 
combined 
transactions 
Codifiability 
of combined 
transactions 
Type of 
governance 
Implementation 
Safeguards 
Institutional 
context  
Upgrading of 
DC firm in 
performance 
& GSP terms 
        
        
        
        
        
  Source: authors’ own illustration 
 
Finally, operationalising our theoretical concepts is quite a problem, not least the concepts 
used in the GVC governance & upgrading theory. The operationalisation of the CSR concept 
may be less problematic by using the Global Compact triple dimensions of human rights 
(HR), labour rights and environmental sustainability (Post & Carroll 2003). For the present 
                                                 
2 Variables of industry/sector CSR problems, CSR best practices in industry/sector, CSR challenges facing the 
recipient firm, CSR support from other stakeholders than customers. 
3 Company’s way of addressing and integrating CSR activities in company routines and organisation, and 
collaboration between the firm and other stakeholders to further CSR initiatives.  
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purpose the labour rights, occupational health and safety and environmental sustainability 
may suffice considering that human rights concern the citizen-state relationship and not the 
citizen-company relationship, which is covered by the labour rights and environmental issue. 
Codes of conducts are available like the GRI reporting criteria, the SA 8000, the OHSAS 
18001 and the ISO 14001. Yet, it is just as important to take the actors’ own conceptions and 
perceptions of the CSR concept and discourse into consideration because these 
understandings inform the perceived space of action and options for decision-making. 
    As mentioned before, the study did not undertake an investigation of transaction 
relationships between the business parties. This means that the principal firm does not appear 
with capability and strategy in its own right. It appears only as the driver of competitive 
principles (cost, quality, niche) as perceived by the recipient developing country firm. 
Moreover, the codifiability of the transaction is to be settled in public in the sense that, if 
there are CSR standards available, we assume that the CSR transaction is codified or 
possessing high potential codifiability. Finally, the institutional set-up of CSR in Malaysia 
was investigated, but this aspect of CSR is less theorised and hence less systematically 
addressed. The explanatory logic is outlined in figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Explanatory logic of the interface between offshore outsourcing and CSR upgrading. 
 
Global Value Chain 
  Offshore outsourcing 
CSR conception 
 
Malaysian vendor                                                       CSR upgrading 
  CSR organisation 
 
 
Malaysian business & political context 
 Source: Authors’ own illustration   
 
Based on these considerations, our approach to the analysis of the OO-CSR nexus of 
Malaysian firms includes three steps. First, we make an overall data matrix comprising the 
profiles of the companies, their CSR conceptions, the type of governance, implementation of 
quality standards, institutional support and relate these factors to the CSR capability as 
perceived by the Malaysian firms. Hereby, we aim for identification of the structural position 
of the Malaysian firms in their global value chains and institutional context and their CSR 
capability (table 2, appendix). Second, we make an internal analysis of the firm’s CSR 
organisation, activities and performance (upgrading). Hereby, we disclose the internal 
mechanism by which the Malaysian firms operationalise the CSR agenda, and how they 
perform in CSR terms (table 3, appendix). Finally, we investigate the interface between the 
business and societal institutions which may condition the CSR performance of the Malaysian 
firms. This will enable us to analyse whether the business and societal contexts affect the CSR 
performance of the Malaysian firms (table 4, appendix). Yet, before we undertake these 
analyses we want to situate the Malaysian firms in their overall institutional context and the 
emerging Malaysian CSR discourse.    
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4. Institutional context 
The emergence of a Malaysian CSR discourse takes place in a hybrid of a political economy 
where the economy is very open in terms of foreign trade and foreign direct investments, and 
has been for decades, while the political system is very closed defending the newborn 
sovereignty of 1957. Some kind of a bourgeois revolution took place in the 1980s when the 
executive power overruled the aristocratic powers of the sultans and the King, but no 
deepening of the authoritarian democratic system took place and no strong civil society 
evolved. The financial crisis of 1997-98 changed the political perceptions of corporate 
governance and nurtured the rise of a new CSR discourse. The section outlines the changing 
political economy of Malaysia, the government’s construction of a new CSR agenda, and the 
roles played by the Securities Commission, by NGOs, and by corporate entities. Finally, 
Malaysia’s CSR record is assessed by international standards. 
 
The political economy of the emergent CSR discourse in Malaysia 
Malaysia is a multi-ethnic industrialising society that has been ruled by a coalition of 
ethnically based parties, de facto in power since 1957 (the Alliance), and by an expanded 
coalition of parties (National Front) under the hegemony of UMNO since 1974. Since 1971 
Malaysia has pursued and implemented an affirmative strategy in favour of the Bumiputera 
(Malays and other indigenous) community in order to elevate the Bumiputeras to economic 
equality with the Chinese and Indian communities and alleviate poverty. This development 
policy has tried to mobilise foreign direct investment (FDI) and partner with TNCs, while 
simultaneously supporting the development of a Bumiputera Commerical and Industrial 
Community (BCIC). What happened was that foreign-owned corporate equity declined while 
both the Bumi and the non-Bumi Malaysian-owned equities increased but without 
diminishing the relative distance between the share of corporate equity between the Bumi and 
the non-Bumi communities (Government of Malaysia, 1991). 
    Since the early 1990s, the government has disclosed CSR aspirations, when Tun Dr 
Mahathir Mohamed, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, conceived the Vision 2020 to 
drive the country from being a consumer society into being a knowledge generating society. 
Three out of the nine challenges of the Vision - a moral and ethical community, a fully caring 
culture, and an economically just society – reflect the principles of CSR.  
    However, in the wake of the East Asian crisis 1997, the issue of good corporate governance 
became a key issue internationally and among East Asian countries. It was claimed among 
Northern countries and international financial institutions that bad corporate governance and 
especially corruption and ‘cronyism’ explained the debacle of the East Asian Miracle (Rodan, 
Hewison and Robinson, 2001: 18). The Malaysian government had been adjusting its 
legislation and regulations continuously, during the 1990s, in favour of a more liberal market 
institution, but during the financial crisis Malaysia enacted controversial anti-IMF crisis 
governance, which re-regulated and restricted the cross-border flow of FDI for some time. 
Although the policy prevented the Malaysian economy from a meltdown and the Malaysian 
business community (especially the BCIC) from bankruptcy, it changed the reputation of 
Malaysia as a pro-FDI country.  
    Since 1997, the FDI inflow has never regained its former momentum. It dropped from 7.3 
billion USD in 1996 to 2.7 billion USD in 1998, and recovered at a level of 4-5 billion USD 
2004-05. Although Malaysia received about 6.1 billion USD in FDI inflow in 2006, the 
outflow of FDI matched the inflow for the first time (UNCTAD various WIR). The 
capitalisation of the stock market in Malaysia decreased slightly from 1996 to 2006 while the 
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stock markets in Hong Kong, South Korea, India and Singapore increased several times 
(Economist, December 2nd, 2006, p. 33). If stock market capitalisation is an indicator of 
investors’ confidence in the effective corporate governance of public limited companies, 
Malaysia's reputation has fallen behind several of its regional competitors for foreign direct 
investments.  
 
The Government’s new CSR agenda 
    In order to demonstrate its commitment to achieving economic progress that is consistent 
with good personal values and corporate ethics, the government presented the Malaysian 
‘Business Code of Ethics’ in 2002 and supplemented the code with a ‘National Integrity Plan’ 
and the founding of the Integrity Institute of Malaysia (IIM) in 2004. Among the key 
objectives to be achieved by IIM within the next five years are the need to enhance the 
standards of corporate governance and business ethics and also to improve the quality of life 
and the well being of the citizens.   
    Government-linked companies are generally perceived by the government as the drivers of 
the Malaysian corporate sector because they "comprise more than a third of the capitalization 
of Bursa Malaysia and half of the KL Composite Index" (Yakcop 2007). In line with the 
government’s commitment and determination to drive the development of the GLCs, the state 
investment arm Khazanah National Bhd (KNB) launched The Silver Book on September 
2006 under its GLC Transformation Programme. The Book provides a set of principles and 
guidelines to be implemented by GLCs so that they can contribute proactively to society 
while creating value for shareholders; it also guides GLCs on how they can clarify and 
manage social obligation (Khazanah National Bhd, 2006). Since then, a collaborative CSR 
initiative by the GLCs, The Ministry of Education, and State Education Departments named 
PINTAR (Promoting Intelligence, Nurturing Talent and Advocating Responsibility) has been 
launched to foster academic excellence particularly among rural school children. As of 
October 2007, 57 schools involving more than 20,000 primary and secondary students have 
been “adopted” by the GLCs. Under the PINTAR programme, the GLCs are required to go 
beyond one-off financial contribution. Instead they are expected to actively participate in 
ongoing projects such as extra and remedial tuition classes for underprivileged students, 
nutrition programmes, motivation classes and skill building workshops (Khazanah Nasional 
Bhd, 2007). 
    In sum, the Malaysian government emphasised the importance of the CSR-related 
principles in its long-term development perspective. In fact, the government argues that there 
is a fit between the country’s long term development and the promotion of CSR: 
 
    "One of the hallmarks of our development agenda throughout the past half century is 
achieving economic growth with equity, particularly in terms of income distribution and 
poverty eradication. These socio-economic achievements, indeed, reflect the same set of 
positive values which form the backbone of social responsibility" (Yakcop 2007). 
 
Government linked institutions: The Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia 
A key player in the construction of the Malaysian discourse on CSR has been the Securities 
Commission (SC). The SC’s statement on the emergence of CSR and its own role discloses 
how the forces have played out until now (interview 2006-12-15): 
     
Question: ”How and when did the Security Commission (SC) got involved in Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR)?” 
 11
Answer: ”The SC started developing initiatives to improve the various aspects of corporate 
governance since 1985. It was an uphill battle at that time. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 
provided further reasons for SC to adopt a more concerted approach towards corporate 
governance reform. SC participated in the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance in 
1998 to identify and deal with weaknesses highlighted by the crisis in the governance 
framework, and their findings showed that companies must be responsible to all the 
stakeholders. In the early 2000, Malaysia companies became more aware of their 
responsibilities not just towards the shareholders but also to the other stakeholders. SC started 
promoting CSR through awareness programmes, instead of setting rules, as CSR is a 
voluntary practice and is a business behaviour over and above what is ordinarily required by 
legal requirements. SC's current chairman Dato' Zarina Anwar, came on board on 2004 from 
Shell Malaysia and brought along Shell's CSR culture to SC.”   
 
Hence, improved corporate governance was the overall objective which came to include the 
CSR agenda, and this agenda has been conceived as a voluntary and domestic endeavour and 
informed by a TNC like Shell. The SC did not link the CSR agenda directly to the question of 
offshore outsourcing, but nor are the two issues disconnected (interview op.cit.): 
 
Question: ”Is the CSR agenda in any way related to the trend of offshoring / outsourcing in 
the global economy?”  
Answer: ”Not specifically. However, SC's CSR agenda looks at the enhancement of global 
competitiveness of Malaysian companies. SC is keen to see more companies incorporate CSR 
into their corporate governance agenda to increase their profile, so that they can gain 
recognition from the perspective of international and domestic institutional investors.  In view 
that the guides in UN Global Compact is consistent with the teaching of Islam, it is also in 
SC's agenda to establish Malaysia as the centre for international Islamic capital market in line 
with the Capital Market Masterplan.” 
 
Finally, The SC focuses its energy on awareness-raising and takes its main result to be its 
positive impact on the raising of public awareness about CSR issues: 
 
Question: ”How does SC promotes its CSR framework? 
Answer: ”SC co-hosted a CSR conference with the British High Commission in 2004 with the 
objective of creating and strenthening awareness of CSR and its growing importance among 
local companies. SC co-hosted a CSR seminar with UNDP in 2006 to create awareness and to 
support UNDP Malaysia's effort in CSR. SC strongly encourages Malaysian companies to put 
in more effort to achieve membership for the UN Global Compact.” 
Question: ”What has SC achieved in the CSR field so far?”  
Answer: ”Key achievement - CSR is no longer an alien word in the corporate landscape 
through the numerous awareness programmes.” 
 
Bursa Malaysia (BM) launched the CSR framework in September 2006 after having worked 
with CSR since 2004 (interview 2006-12-04). The framework represents a set of voluntary 
guidelines for publicly listed and government-owned companies to address matters related to 
responsibility and ethics in the course of their normal pursuit of profits. 
(http://www.klse.com.my/website/bm/, access on: November 2006).   
    BM, which is incorporated as a GLC company, contends that the government has not taken 
the initiative in CSR. It is stated that “Contrary to Europe where the UK government and the 
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EU Commission have expanded ethical resources in pension funds, in Malaysia we focus 
much more on competitiveness” (interview 2006-12-04) However, “no one really looked into 
what the PLCs were doing”. In order to increase the competitiveness of GLCs, the Malaysian 
government wanted to improve their CSR record. Yet, this approach had partly been 
influenced by civil society: “Many NGOs have been actively promoting CSR for years in 
Malaysia even within political parties” (BM interview 2006-12-04).  
    Hence, it is ironic that the NGOs have been successfully promoting the CSR discourse for 
years, but when it is adopted, at least rhetorically, by state agencies and the government the 
overriding purpose is to increase competitiveness and profitability in an international market 
environment that has shifted to acknowledge CSR. Moreover, it is a bit surprising that the 
Securities Commission encourages Malaysian firms to join the UN Global Compact because 
this Compact requires that the participants endorse the core ILO labour rights, including the 
freedom of association, which is neither accepted by the Malaysian government and has nor 
been ratified by the parliament! 
 
Non-governmental organisations and the business community    
CSR Malaysia was formed on November 2006, and was later renamed as the Institute of 
Corporate Responsibility Malaysia (ICRM). It is a network of 34 corporate institutions 
(mostly blue chip companies and GLCs) committed to advancing responsible business 
strategies and practices that have triple-bottom-line impact – on people, the environment and 
economies. It is strongly supported by the SC, BM and KNB. The strategic thrust of ICRM is 
capacity and capability building. Since its inception, it has carried out a series of multi-
disciplinary workshops that address issues ranging from GRI Standards and stakeholder 
engagement to climate change. (Ibrahim, 2007)    
 Local professional associations such as ACCA also have been active on CSR issues for 
years. The annual ACCA Malaysia Environmental and Social Reporting Awards (MESRA) 
aims to identify and reward the participating corporations for their innovative attempts to 
communicate organizational performance through disclosure of environmental, social or full 
sustainability information. The MESRA award winners of 2005 were British American 
Tobacco (Malaysia) Berhad for the Best Social Report category, and Alan Flora Sdn Bhd for 
the Best Environmental Report category. Shell Refining Company Berhad and Telekom 
Malaysian Berhad were awarded for having the best environmental reporting and social 
reporting, respectively, in their annual reports. (Tay, 2006) 
    In general, it is interesting to note that the Malaysian companies which have effective CSR 
reporting prefer to act on social and environmental causes that they can relate to. For 
example, Gamuda Land markets eco-friendly homes and neighbourhood, Alam Flora carries 
out community education for a clean environment, and Maxis Communication organizes 
internet camps around the country for the underprivileged children. Nonetheless, the small 
and medium size enterprises (“SME”) which form the backbone of Malaysia’s economic 
structure4 are still lagging behind in terms of CSR. This is because these companies view 
managing environmental and social matters as time consuming and unproductive affairs 
(Sustainability, 2005). 
    According to the ACCA report titled ‘The State of Corporate Environmental Reporting in 
Malaysia’ published in early 2002, Corporate Environmental Reporting (CER) in Malaysia is 
still in its infancy. Tan, Zainal and Cheong (1990) conclude that voluntary disclosure in 
Malaysia is an exception rather than the norm despite the fact that users would prefer to see 
                                                 
4 At end of year 2005, the SMEs constituted 92% of the total number of companies registered with the 
Companies’ Commission of Malaysia, contributed 29.1% of manufacturing output and easily account for one 
third of the total employment. 
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more non-mandatory information.  Chan (2000) argues that government directions to disclose 
environmental information are the influence most likely to cause a change of practice. In 
addition, Thompson and Zakaria (2003) comment that the lack of pressure from other 
stakeholders such as the non-government organizations and pressure groups may explain why 
only few companies take CER seriously. They further elaborate that CER requires the 
companies to be transparent and open - characteristics that are far from prevalent in Southeast 
Asian cultures. 
    The emergence of socially responsible investment (SRI) in recent years has also provided 
an added impetus to CSR and in turn CER in Malaysia. SRI encompasses social and/or 
environmental criteria in the investment decision-making-process. Thus, SRI provides 
incentives for listed companies to be socially and environmentally responsible as a means of 
attracting funds from social investors.  In January, 2003, Maybank, Malaysia’s largest bank, 
launched the country’s first socially responsible fund - the Maybank Ethical Trust Fund.  
 
Malaysia’s CSR performance in an international perspective 
Taking an international CSR standard perspective, the record of Malaysia is rather bleak. The 
Malaysian government has ratified most of the core international labour rights, except the 
right to form independent trade unions (preventing the formation of a large electrical & 
electronics industrial union), but the enforcement of these ILO labour rights are far from 
international standards and the Malaysian Trades Union Congress complains about violations 
of trade union rights (MTUC 2002, ITUC 2007). Presently, the government, together with the 
National Institution of OHS, has established the legislation of occupational health and safety 
standards and has, furthermore, upgraded its environmental policy and planning.  
    However, the government is not known for taking a pro-active and progressive stance in 
practice on international labour rights, occupational health and safety standards, and 
environmental issues. In fact, Malaysia does not rank high - or even appear - on several 
international CSR indexes; for example: 
a) there is only one firm – and a foreign controlled firm (Dupont Malaysia Sdn Bhd since 
20035) that appears at the UN Global Compact 2007 list for Malaysia;  
b) no Malaysian bank participates in the group behind the IFC Equator Principles; 
c) Malaysia does not adhere to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
although other non-OECD countries do - e.g. Brazil (see UNCTAD (2006) WIR 2006, 
ch. VI, section D).  
d) In terms of SA 8000, only two Malaysian firms are registered by June 2006 (SAI, 
www.sa-intl.org/): Pan Century Edible Oils Sdn. Bhd. which manufactures palm oil 
and palm oil products, and Pan-Century Oleochemicals Sdn. Bhd. that makes and 
distributes acids and glycerine.  
e) In 2004, only two Malaysian incorporated companies, the BAT Malaysia and Sime 
Derby, appeared on the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index (DJSI) among 310 
companies; and  
f) Only 26 Malaysian companies, including the Golden Hope Plantations Berhad, 
subscribed to the Malaysian Chapter of the Global Forest and Trade and, hence, to 
minimum certification standards (Razak 2004: 19). 
 
It is interesting to note that the SA 8000 criteria may be supplemented by the criterion of 
collective agreement with independent trade unions, expanding the group of socially 
                                                 
5 In 2006, Ford Malaysia did also appear among the UN Global Compact participants in Malaysia. In 2007, a 
new Malaysian service company has entered the list, Shah Educational Systems Sdn Bhd.  
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accountable firms vis-à-vis trade unions. Yet, the BAT which obtained the DJSI status made a 
reclassification of jobs in 2006 which stripped the BAT enterprise union of 60 per cent of its 
membership, and the Industrial Relations authorities have not responded to the complaints of 
the union (ITUC 2007). In terms of ISO 14001 & EMAS, Malaysia held 694 in December 
2005, of which 246 were 14001:2004 (ISO Survey of Certification 2005, www.iso.org/). In 
terms of the OHSAS 18001 the standard was co-authored by, among others, the Standards and 
Industrial Institute of Malaysia. No numbers on firm certification are available at this moment 
(ultimo 2006). 
    Even in a regional perspective, Malaysia does not seem to improve its position. In the 
recent survey on corporate governance quality in Asia, jointly conducted by investment house 
CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets and Hong Kong based Asian Corporate Governance Association 
(ACGA), Malaysia was ranked as joint sixth (with Korea), down two slots since October 
2005. The report observed that, even though on the surface the corporate governance 
environment in Malaysia seemed to be on an improving trend, the extent of penetration of 
corporate governance to the Malaysian business culture remained limited. In addition, the 
recent accounting irregularities at publicly listed companies, such as Transmile Holdings 
Berhad, Megan Media Holdings Berhad, Welli Multi Corp Berhad and NasionCom Holdings 
Berhad, hit the equity market badly (Oh, 2007). 
 News that threatened to weaken the country’s corporate governance record per se was the 
discovery of irregularities in the accounting records of the Malaysian Institute of Corporate 
Governance (MICG) – the very institution that was formed in 1998 to spearhead the drive for 
a higher standard of governance and transparency.  It was reported that, due to weak internal 
controls in its 2006 financial statement, MICG could stand to lose up to RM 94,173.  
Specifically, MICG pointed out that “certain employees of the institute, who have since left, 
have allegedly stolen property of the institute, which includes unspecified amounts of funds, 
cheques, documents relating to accounting records and membership database”. Even though 
the amount is not large, it is extremely significant considering MICG’s status as a non-profit 
organisation and its income-base that comprises of membership fees, annual subscriptions, 
grants, and publication sales (Gabriel, 2007). 
 
 
5. Offshore outsourcing and CSR among local firms in Malaysia 
The analysis of the interface between offshore outsourcing and CSR upgrading in Malaysia is 
conducted by way of, firstly, establishing the relations between the global value chain 
perspective and the OO profile of the investigated Malaysian firms; and secondly, describing 
and explaining the Malaysian firms’ CSR capabilities, followed by a discussion of the CSR 
mechanisms instituted and the perceived CSR upgrading of the firms. Finally, the institutional 
effects on company CSR capabilities and upgrading are highlighted and wind up the analysis. 
  
The OO profile of Malaysian firms and their global value chain position 
The OO profile of a firm is not necessarily identical with its global value chain position. We 
hypothesise that if buyer-driven value chains like garment & textiles & chemicals provide 
more space for suppliers’ upgrading and hence more leeway for (additional) production of 
own products and more market-based transaction, these firms will vary according to 
subcontracting activities. However, producer-driven chains, like the global automobile 
industry and the global electronics industry, will provide less space for functional upgrading 
and hence, suppliers will be more ‘captured’ by their customers and have a much larger 
turnover in subcontracting. If the firm is only embedded in local value chains (domestic 
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management control and domestic market orientation), it will probably have less 
subcontracting. In fact, these expectations are corroborated by our sample except for company 
I (table 5). This company is a subsidiary of a global first-tier supplier with its own technology 
and brand products. 
 
Table 5: Distribution of sample firms according to global value chain position and (sub-) contracting as 
part of total turnover (2006). 
 
Global value chain position Contracting/sub-
contracting/turnover  Producer-driven Buyer-driven Local value chain 
Minor I D A, E 
Substantial   C  
Most F, G, H B  
Source: Authors’ own illustration 
 
As mentioned before, our study sample of Malaysian firms was selected from two angles: 
Offshore outsourcing activities or CSR reporting. Regarding the OO criterion, the sample 
comprises four firms with more than 2/3 of their turnover being conceived as contract or 
subcontract deliveries (firm B, F, G, H, see table 2, annex). A fifth firm (firm C) reports that 
subcontracting forms a substantial part of their sales, and that the firm exports 60% of its 
goods and 30% to domestically operating foreign firms, that is, 90% of its turnover is 
internationalised. Of the three firms with minor subcontracting activities (A, D, E), only one 
(firm D) had substantial export while the rest had little export. However, a few had foreign 
customers located in Malaysia (firm A and E).  
    The firms A, E, H were selected because of their CSR profile, indicated by their 
participation in the ACCA MESRA 2005 contest. Hence, only one firm (H) combined the 
selection properties of OO and CSR from the outset, but it did not export very much (below 
10% of sales)! The most outstanding firm in terms of subcontracting in offshore outsourcing 
is company F with 95 percent, of which around 50 percent was exported and a quarter was 
sold to foreign customers in Malaysia! This company is located within the electronics 
industry and has more than 3000 employees in total, whom are spread over many locations 
both in Malaysia and abroad in the East Asian region.  
    Given the variety of the sampled firms, it is valid to contend that the global value chain 
location of the Malaysian firms conditions their offshore outsourcing activity. 
  
Explaining the perceived CSR capability of Malaysian firms    
The perceived CSR capability of the nine selected Malaysian firms is chosen to be the first 
dependent factor to be examined. The answers provided by the firms are a bit surprising 
because nearly all express that the company can meet customer demands about CSR (only one 
would not outright claim that the company had the capabilities to handle CSR issues). How 
can this be the case when we would expect that CSR is a new and emerging agenda which 
Malaysian firms are not yet prepared to handle in a proper way.  
    One explanation could be that the firms perceive the CSR agenda as rather simple and less 
challenging. In fact, none of the selected firms claimed that they took the CSR problem areas 
to be complex, although several modified their statement that the answer depended on the 
CSR issue involved. This could be due to the low level of awareness and understanding 
among the firms in terms of the true essence of CSR, and that this ignorance is reflected in 
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their perception. This is in line with Amran’s (2006) study that endeavours to establish CSR 
from the managers’ perspective. The study eventually concludes that Malaysian firms practice 
CSR in the absence of proper understanding of the concept of CSR itself.  
    Another explanation could be that the firms possessed knowledge and experience 
complying with international quality standards, including CSR standards like the ISO 14001, 
OHSAS 18001 and for automobile suppliers TS 16949 including OHSAS 18001. In fact, all 
OO recipient firms (B, F, G, H) had acquired CSR standards like the ISO 14001, OHSAS 
18001, or TS 16949. Among the non OO firms (A, D, E) only one qualified with a CSR 
standard, and this firm was a GLC firm (E). This firm also relied on institutional support from 
the outside being a GLC firm, while most of the sample firms claimed that they did not get 
external support.  
    All the OO recipient firms took their customer relationships to be long term, except for 
company B, which emphasised that its market was segmented and only part of it was 
characterised as long term. Overall, and independently of the existence of OO transactions, 
the companies claimed that they had some kind of stable inter-firm relations and most often 
long term relationships with their customers. Hence, this factor does not explain differences 
among firms but it may instead condition that the firms are in general confident in their 
abilities to handle CSR demands from customers.  
    Finally, the sample firms faced a market where customers demanded competitive quality, 
or quality and price, or they described their market as a niche market. Only in one instance a 
Malaysian firm mentioned that the CSR agenda did pop up, but this was more a concern of 
the TNCs and not conveyed to the Malaysian firms. Yet, asked about whether CSR claims 
appeared as a compulsory or voluntary matter, our four OO recipient firms all perceived the 
claims as compulsory due to competitive pressures, customer insistence or governmental 
regulation. The ‘non-OO’ firms (with minor OO activities) were more inclined to state that 
CSR issues were a voluntary issue. The ultimate assessment of CSR as an expenditure, 
investment or a moral plight in itself triggered a more varied response from the OO firms 
(with substantial or most OO activities) as well as the non OO firms. In fact, six firms (C, D, 
E, F, H, I) considered CSR as some kind of a moral obligation or a question of business ethics 
although only one firm took it to be a human plight above anything else (firm C). 
    Overall, the sample firms agreed that they possessed the competences necessary for 
accommodating customers’ demands for CSR activities, and that the CSR problem area was 
rather simple. Yet, the OO firms felt that CSR claims were forced upon them through 
competition or by the authorities, while non-OO firms were more inclined to see the CSR 
agenda as a voluntary discourse. OO firms had also established international CSR standards 
while the same was not done by non-OO firms, although all sample firms complied with at 
least the lowest level of international quality standards, the ISO 9000. The most OO involved 
firm (company F) was the only one to claim that it had its own personnel to deal with CSR 
issues.   
 
CSR mechanisms and CSR upgrading strategy among Malaysian firms 
Let us now take a closer look at the kind and degree of CSR upgrading among the Malaysian 
firms and the explanatory power of their internal mechanisms.  Here, it is remarkable that 
nearly all firms (seven) confirmed that they had initiated CSR activities on their own, while 
one firm (firm I) declined that it had done so, and one respondent did not know about such 
initiatives. Yet, all firms stated that they had not been forced into CSR upgrading by 
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customers or competitors6. The only firm, which directly felt that it was driven by the market 
to do something about CSR, was a wood-based manufacturing firm (firm B), which had to 
comply with FSO standards and passed them on to its raw-material suppliers.  Only two other 
firms did also demand their suppliers to take on CSR standards (firm F, G). Hence, the only 
company, which did not put pressure on its suppliers, was firm H, the only firm, which among 
the sample of OO firms also appeared in the ACCA MESRA 2005 participation. This firm is 
a GLC and part of the governments Transformation Programme with the Silver Book 
initiative.  
    It is interesting to note that the executive director in firm B had personally shown a keen 
interest in the issues pertaining to global warming after having seen the Al Gore film about 
global warming. He has been trying to create an environmentally friendly culture within the 
organization and implement various energy-saving and anti-pollution measures, such as 
installing heat resistance laminated windows in the manufacturing plant and implementing 
saw dust collection system. 
   One common characteristic among the sample firms was that they would upgrade on CSR 
in the year ahead by way of enhancing CSR reporting, taking on OHS improvements or 
upgrading their environmental impact on the surroundings. This pattern can then be compared 
to the existing level of CSR routines, where five sample firms (A, C, D, G, H) undertook both 
environmental and social CSR routines - comprising mostly CSR targeting, monitoring and 
reporting initiatives. Some firms (B, I) stated that no CSR routines existed, but in both these 
cases the firms reported that they had achieved the OHSAS 18001 certification, either directly 
or as part of the TS 16949 standards.  
    This pattern can also be related to the integration of CSR issues in strategies and 
organisation, as all sample firms agreed that they, in one way or another, deal with elements 
of CSR in their vision, mission, strategy, policies, organisation or operations. Yet, no firm 
applied a triple bottom line approach to their business. This picture of raising CSR awareness, 
own and voluntary CSR initiatives and yet a diversity of sporadic to systematic integration of 
CSR aspects testifies to the emergence of a CSR agenda in Malaysia, but also to the huge 
differences in actual practices and coherent tackling of the CSR problems.  
    Finally, most sample firms perceived the CSR challenges facing the firm to be the same 
facing their industry. In three cases, the firms stated that they had particular problems but 
these problems could be interpreted as industry-specific problems. Only in one firm, the 
respondent argued that the firm faced particular problems, and these problems were related to 
the product quality standards of the export destination (EU) and spilled over into the 
awareness of the employees and the philosophy pursued by the management.  
    In sum, the data do not seem to indicate that there is a strong link between the firms’ CSR 
routines, upgrading or future plans and their OO positions or industry locations. However, 
there is a correspondence between the perceived customer pressure for CSR upgrading and 
the support delivered by the customers for such activities - positive in the case of four firms 
(B, D, F, H), negative in the case of three firms (A, C, I), and mixed in the case of two firms 
(E, G). In the case of one of the GLC firms (E), it was argued that the Malaysian consumers 
were naive and did not push the firms to upgrade their CSR standing and what mattered was 
the price of the standard products. For firm G, one could question the response given that the 
customers or competitors did force CSR upgrading on the firm, because the firm is in a 
process of completing its certification of the TS 16949 standard which is the state of the art in 
the firm’s industry - auto component manufacturing (Wad 2006). 
                                                 
6 We eliminate the ISO 9000 as a non CSR standard, and the EUC ROHS technical standard against lead in 
electronic production which is at best a political intervention, not a market pressure. 
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    Finally, the interface between global value chain position, OO profile, and the adoption of 
reactive or proactive CSR strategising does not seem to display the expected pattern. The two 
firms in domestically driven value chains and with only minor involvement in offshore 
outsourcing demonstrate clear-cut pro-active CSR strategising. One of these firms is 
government-linked (firm E), while the other (firm A) is a joint venture between a merger of 
two TNCs with majority (51 percent) control and Malaysian equity interests, but managed as 
a ‘multinational’ organisation with a decentralised decision-making structure and local 
autonomy (Dicken 2003: 215). But putting these two firms aside proactive CSR strategising 
firms are all taking on (sub-) contracting businesses as a substantial or dominant share of their 
portfolio. Hence, offshore outsourcing matters and so does local political interventions and 
institutions. 
 
Table 6: Distribution of sample firms according to global value chain position and (sub)contracting as 
part of total turnover (2006). 
CSR Strategising Global value 
chain 
position 
Contracting/sub-         
contracting/turnover  Non-active Reactive   Reactive & Proactive 
Proactive 
Minor I  
Substantial   
Producer 
driven Most   F, H G 
Minor  D   
Substantial C
Buyer 
driven 
Most   B  
Minor A, E
Substantial  
Domestic 
driven Most     
Source: authors’ own illustration 
 
Summing up on the internal CSR dynamics of the sample firms, we notice that a CSR 
momentum seemed to be evolving among the sample firms located in a diversity of industries 
- both in terms of voluntary initiatives of the firms and their future plans. Proactive CSR 
strategising is taking place among ‘OO’-firms but also among ‘non-OO’ firms, due to the 
influence of the domestic context (see next section). However, no systematic approaches have 
been established so far, and no integrated and coherent CSR strategy has been applied. The 
differences among firms are also due to differences in customer pressure and customer 
support for CSR upgrading among their Malaysian partners. Overall, all but one company 
took an active CSR stand, be it reactive or proactive, but whether the strategising is 
implemented in business practices is open for questioning. The CSR discourse may reach an 
impasse moving from rhetoric to practice and performance. 
 
The impact of the business and societal context on CSR capability and upgrading 
The peculiar common features among our sample firms in terms of perceived CSR capability 
and voluntary CSR momentum do not seem to be fully explained by industry specific 
conditions, although the CSR problematic is understood as a general sector issue and seldom 
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perceived as a particularistic firm challenge. The question is whether and how the CSR 
commonality is caused or conditioned by cross-industry structures or societal institutions.  
    Most firms (A, B, C, D, F, G, I) do overwhelmingly point towards environmental and OHS 
problems as the key problems bedevilling their industry.  The two exceptions are both GLCs - 
firm E denying that the sector faces any CSR problems, only problems of society like caring 
for the disabled, and firm H which takes the Silver Book as the authoritative identification of 
CSR problems (of GLCs). Both these firms have a high CSR profile and participated in the 
ACCA MESRA 2005 contest! Both firms may anyhow deceive themselves by taking the 
challenges of the customers or consumers as the key indicators of the sector, inferring that if 
such challenges do not appear, no CSR problems exist. This interpretation assumes that the 
market forces are the drivers of CSR and not ethical reflections or governmental policies of 
national branding or global value chain upgrading.  
    However, none of the sample firms argued that there had been some kind of a CSR crisis 
like the Enron scandal in the USA or environmental disasters like the Bhopal crisis in India or 
Exxon Valdes in Alaska, USA. Yet, a tiny majority of the sample firms (B, C, F, G, H) could 
identify a best-practice firm in their industry, and in these cases the leading CSR firm was a 
foreign firm, except in one case - Sime Darby, a huge GLC. In three cases Japanese TNCs 
were graded as the corporations with the best CSR practices; IKEA was the only western firm 
mentioned. 
    The alternative source of support for CSR upgrading, beyond the eventual HQs of 
subsidiaries or joint ventures and especially the customer, could be other company 
stakeholders and the larger society. In most cases, our sample firms do not recognise any 
support from other stakeholders or third party certification, but in some cases firms 
acknowledge the support of ACCA and the government, and for third party certification the 
GLC institution of SIRIM is mentioned twice. On the one hand, Malaysian firms seem to be 
stand-alone-entities when taken on the CSR agenda, emphasising individual and voluntary 
CSR initiatives. On the other hand, they seem quite dependent on customer support and 
pressure together with government initiatives and institutional support.  
    Hence, the sample firms and their conceptions of and practices on CSR issues reflect the 
dual exposure to customers and their embeddedness in global value chains, and to their 
societal embeddedness within Malaysian institutions and political and socio-cultural 
dynamics; but they do also testify to the importance of the agency of individual managers, 
employees and relevant stakeholders.  
     
6. Conclusion 
Offshore outsourcing and corporate social responsibility are not entirely new phenomena in 
international business, but they attracted increasing public scrutiny and debate in the global 
North during the 1990s and early 21st century in the wake of rapid economic globalisation, 
offshoring of jobs on a massive scale, disclosure of corporate financial scandals, and breach 
of international labour and environmental standards.  
    With the expansion of global value chains leading, corporations with global activities 
increasingly engaged developing country firms in non-equity based business transactions 
while disintegrating and focusing their vertically integrated corporate structures around their 
core competencies and activities. Offshore outsourcing created space for local firms to 
contract or subcontract original equipment manufacturing or even original design functions 
which again might pave the way for the ultimate upgrading into original brand manufacturing. 
Concomitantly, the thresholds for accessing global value chains have been increasing as 
indicated by the rise of international quality standards and certification requirements 
instigated by corporate chain leaders. CSR is part and parcel of this new standard setting.  
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    In Malaysia, the government long pursued an alliance policy with Northern TNCs in order 
to attract FDI and create economic growth and employment through the offshoring of 
standard TNC activities like labour intensive assembling of electronics components. 
However, from the 1990s the Malaysian government aimed for value chain upgrading as 
envisaged in its Second Industrial Master Plan (1996/2005) and Third Industrial Master Plan 
(2006/2020) together with the five year Malaysia Plans and the vision plan of 1991 (Vision 
2020). With the East Asian financial crisis enhanced, corporate governance rose to highest 
priority in political circles in order to regain and sustain the inflow of FDI and portfolio 
capital and in addition to enhance the international competitiveness of Malaysian TNCs. CSR 
became part of the corporate governance agenda, but it did also provide an avenue for new 
Malaysian government under Abdullah Badawi to emphasise cross-ethnic human values and 
moral integrity as a rallying point for national unity, coined in the National Integrity Plan of 
2004, and translated into the Transformation Programme for government-linked companies 
(GLCs).  
    The present study of a small sample of Malaysian companies, which is composed of firms 
contracting more or less offshore outsourcing (OO) activities and with a more or less 
articulated CSR profile, highlights that there is a connection between OO transactions, the 
emerging governmental agenda of CSR, and the reception, strategising and institutionalisation 
of CSR in Malaysian management and organisation. The sample firms, operating in a 
diversity of manufacturing industries, demonstrate a surprising confidence in their own 
capabilities to handle customers’ CSR demands. This confidence seems to spring from the 
firms’ conception that their CSR challenges are rather simple issues and not complex and 
urgent problems, sustained by the rather weak pressure for CSR upgrading from customers 
and consumers in Malaysia, together with the eventual combination of customer claims and 
support embedded in rather long term business relationships between foreign customers and 
local (sub-) contractors.  
    Overall, the CSR agenda has gained a certain momentum, sustained by the Malaysian 
government and related institutions and companies and also adopted by individual firms based 
on considerations regarding cost reduction, investments in quality management, human 
resource development, and product and corporate branding. Yet, the overall positive self-
evaluation of Malaysian firms contrasts with the ranking and participation of Malaysian firms 
in international indexes and CSR contests. At the helm of the CSR pyramid is the UN Global 
Compact (UNGC), which integrates core international principles of human rights, labour 
rights, environmental principles, and business ethics, and no fully owned Malaysian 
manufacturing corporation participates in this forum. One of the challenges posed by the 
UNGC is the insistence on core labour rights, where Malaysia has not complied with the 
covenant on freedom of association due to especially Northern and US electronics TNCs anti-
union policy in Malaysia. 
    The articulation of CSR in Malaysia seems to adopt a version which is not taking the 
agenda very far behind and beyond contemporary legislation, and especially not when it 
regards the power relation between the governing political coalition and TNCs in the core 
areas of Malaysian development policy. This is probably due to the overall weaknesses of 
civil society groups and organisations in Malaysia, although Malaysian NGOs, like civil 
society movements in the North, were important for the revival of the CSR discourse. 
However, if Malaysian corporations are now increasingly undertaking foreign direct 
investments, as indicated by the recent UNCTAD figures of FDI, the firms will face other 
markets and probably also more vigilante consumers and NGOs insisting on a high level of 
CSR in a more civil society supportive environment. Then, rhetoric and strategising must 
translate into CSR business practices and performance in order to enable the firms to 
compete.
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Annexes: 
 
Table 2:  
The structural position of selected Malaysian firms in their global value chain and 
institutional context, 2006 
 
Table 3:  
Company CSR activities, organisation and performance 
 
Table 4:  
Company CSR performance and the business and societal context  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
¤)  
All firms are located in Klang Valley, that is, in the Selangor State and in or around the 
capital, Kuala Lumpur. 
 
#)  
At first these two questions were compounded into one question (Q 19), while Q 18 asked 
whether the firm had a special CSR function or unit.  
 
[ ]  
Researchers' interpretation of answer. 
 
 
Table 2: The structural position of selected Malaysian firms in their global value chain and institutional context, 2006 
DC firm overall  
capabilities ¤) 
CSR conception of DC firm Type of governance Firm 
case 
 
Owner 
ship 
(Q 3) 
Size 
(pro-
file) 
Loca
-tions
(profi
le) 
Foreign  
activities 
(profile) 
Contract/ 
Subcontr
act sales  
(Q 4) 
Export & 
Foreign 
customer in 
Mal. (Q 5 
ODM/ 
OBM 
(Q 6) 
 
Cost/ 
Investment 
(Q 8) 
Voluntary/ 
compulsory/cu
stomer 
pressure (Q 9) 
Principal 
 firm/ 
customer  
Demand 
(Q 26) 
Complexi-ty 
of CSR 
transaction 
(Q 28) 
  
Coordina
tion 
(Q 29) 
Key 
motive 
(Q 27) 
Implemen-
tation of 
quality 
standards 
(Q 7,  
Q 21) 
Institutional 
context 
(Q 14, 
Q 20) 
Competen
ce to meet 
cu-stomer 
CSR 
requireme
nt 
(Q 30) 
A 
 
 
Fore. 
JV 
Public 
listed 
520         1 0 Minor
1-32% 
Local 
customers. 
Few foreign 
No. 
Using 
licence 
Investm.; 
competitiven
ess to be 
enhanced 
Vol. Quality,
niche market 
Simple Long
term, 
trust 
Profit. 
Ethics 
ISO 
9001:2000. 
HACCP; 
No support 
ACCA 
support; 
From exp. 
owners; 
No joint 
action 
Yes 
B 
 
 
Busi-
ness 
group; 
priv. 
lim. 
<1000         2 0 Most
67-100% 
Export 
60-65% 
Yes, 
ODM/
OBM 
most of 
sales 
Cost & 
investm.. 
(OHSAS 
benefits) 
Forced by 
customers; 
later it became 
vol. 
Quality Simple,
although it 
sounds 
complicated 
N.a. 
Three 
segmente
d markets
Profit ISO 9001.
OHSAS 
18001, FSE 
from 
suppliers, 
niche 
customer 
support 
No support 
for 
upgrading; 
employ 
foreign 
labour 
Do not 
know 
C 
 
 
Public 
limited 
132     3 0 Substanti
al  
(33-66%) 
Export 60%, 
foreign 30% 
No Human
plight 
Voluntary, yet 
customer 
wanted ISO 
9000 
Niche market Depends on 
issue 
Long 
term, 
trust 
based 
Ethical 
business 
ISO 9000; no 
support from 
customer 
No support Yes 
D 
 
 
Public 
listed 
private 
400     1 1 Minor
 (1-32%) 
Export 50% ODM/
OBM 
most of 
sales 
Human 
obligation; 
competivenes
s can be 
enhanced 
Voluntary, 
customer 
demand for 
ISO 9000 
Price, quality Depends on 
issue 
Neither 
long, nor 
short 
term 
Profit ISO 9000-
2001; 
customer 
technical 
support 
No support, 
yet SIRIM 
certified 
standards 
Yes 
E 
 
 
GLC 
Public 
listed 
1000+      5 0 Minor
(1-32%) 
Export 
 2-3%. 
Foreign 
customer 
Generi
c prod. 
after 
exp. 
patents 
Investm. 
Moral oblig. 
Compet.enha
nce & 
damaged 
Voluntary Price
(generic), 
Quality 
(brand). 
TNCs CSR 
concern 
Not complex 
if we focus 
and we do 
Long 
term GO 
concessio
n 1994-
2009 
Consciou
s name 
ISO 9001 & 
9002, ISO 
14001, 
ISO 17025 
(lab). 
OHSAS 
18001, 
3S7799 (IT) 
Material with 
GO support; 
Silverbook. 
No critical 
consumers  
Yes, 
depends on 
severity of 
issue 
 
 27
       
Table 2 (continued): The structural position of selected Malaysian firms in their global value chain and institutional context, 2006 
DC firm overall 
capabilities ¤) 
CSR conception of DC firm Type of governance Firm 
case 
 
Owner 
ship 
(Q 3) 
Size 
(pro-
file) 
Loca-
tions 
(profil
e) 
Foreign 
activitie
s 
(profile) 
Contract/ 
Subcontr
act sales 
(Q 4) 
Export & 
Foreign 
customer in 
Mal. (Q 5) 
ODM/ 
OBM 
(Q 6) 
 
Cost/ 
Investment 
(Q 8) 
Voluntary/ 
compulsory/cu
stomer 
pressure (Q 9) 
Principal 
firm/ 
customer 
Demand 
(Q 26) 
Complexi-ty 
of CSR 
transaction 
(Q 28) 
 
Coordina
tion 
(Q 29) 
Key 
motive 
(Q 27) 
Implemen-
tation of 
quality 
standards 
(Q 7, 
Q 21) 
Institutional 
context 
(Q 14, 
Q 20) 
Competen
ce to meet 
cu-stomer 
CSR 
requireme
nt 
(Q 30) 
F 
 
 
Private 
limited 
3000+ 
(Febr. 
2006, 
www) 
many  China,
Thailan
d. Phil. 
Most 
(95%) 
Export 45-
50% directly, 
20-25% 
indir. 
Yes, 
but 
major 
part is 
OEM 
Moral 
obligation; 
investm; 
competit. 
Enhancebut 
costs. 
Forced (EUs 
ROHS) 
Price, quality Simple Long 
term 
Past: 
Serve 
societyFu
ture for 
everyone 
ISO 9000 
(1996) 
ISO 14001 
under audit. 
Advice from 
SIRIM 
 Yes, the 
firm has 
personnel 
to deal with 
CSR 
G 
 
 
Public 
listed 
private 
firm 
3888 
(2005) 
7  6 Most
(>80%) 
 Export 10%, 
85% to 
foreign 
customers in 
Mal 
Yes, 
with 
OEM 
& for 
after 
market 
Past: 
Expenditure. 
Now: 
investm. 
or rather cost 
reduction. 
Compet. 
relates to 
customer 
demands 
Forced by 
competitors & 
authorities 
Price, 
quality. 
No CSR 
demands by 
customers 
Efforts to get 
it right is 
costly. Also 
waste 
treatment 
Long 
term (life 
of model 
& 10 
years for 
spare 
parts  
Profit, 
make 
sharehold
ers 
happy. 
TS 
16949:2002 
end of 2007. 
ISO 
14001:2002 
(2006). 
ISO with 
OEM support
In the past 
from World 
Bank 
Yes, with 
outside 
consultanc
y; train 
own 
trainers. 
H 
 
 
GLC 
 
? 
(>1000 
?) 
13 
subsidi
aries 
(excl. 
ass. 
firms) 
1 
(Thailan
d) 
Probably 
most to 
OEMs? 
Export <10% GEP 
“the 
third 
world”
? 
. 
Combination 
of 
expenditure, 
investm., 
ethics, 
regulat. 
Branding 
Forced by 
customers 
(Toyota) & 
authorities 
Quality, 
customer 
satisfaction 
Simple  Long
(auto)& 
short 
term 
(other 
business)
Share 
holders 
& corp. 
governan
ce 
“The Toyota 
Way” 
TS 16949, 
ISO 9000, 
ISO 14001, 
OHSAS 
18001 
Support 
public school 
in local area 
Yes, if we 
get more 
budget 
I 
 
 
Public 
listed 
private 
firm 
500       1 0 Minor
(1-32%) 
Probably 
‘Most’? 
Export 5% No 
OBM 
or 
ODM 
Moral 
obligation. 
Compet. can 
be enhanced 
Mix of forced 
& voluntary 
Price, quality Depends on 
specific CSR 
issue 
Long 
term & 
trust 
based 
Profit, 
society, 
ethics 
ISO 9000. 
No support 
from 
customers. 
No Yes
K 
 
 
 28,000           300
compa
nies 
19 
countrie
s 
? Export 10 % OBM 
(yet 
Sime 
Tyre 
51% 
acq. by 
Contin
ental 
  TS 16949
OHSAS 
Rely on
Ford’s 
capability 
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Table 3: Company CSR activities, organisation and performance 
Upgrading of CSR Integration of CSR in 
daily routines #) 
Firm 
cases 
CSR 
challenges 
faced by DC 
firm 
(Q 11) 
Company’s 
integration of 
CSR issues in its 
organisation 
(Q 17) 
Env. 
Q 18 
Social 
Q 19 
CSR 
standards 
achieved 
(Q 7) 
CSR 
capability 
(Q 30) 
CSR 
support 
from 
customer 
(Q 13) 
Forced by 
customers or 
compe-titors
( Q 12) 
Own 
initiatives 
(Q 15) 
Demands 
on firm’s 
suppliers 
(Q 16) 
Plans for 
next 
year 
(Q 23) 
A Same as 
industry, firm 
A being part of 
oligopoly 
market 
Vision, policies, 
operations 
Env. 
Targeting, 
monitoring, 
reporting 
Social 
targeting, 
monitoring
, reporting 
HACCP 
(for food 
safety) 
Yes   No No Yes, CSR
reporting 
 No More
time to 
enhance 
CSR 
reporting 
B Do not know 
much about 
competitors, yet 
labour 
constraints & 
employment of 
foreign 
labourers 
Strategy, policies 
(codes of 
conduct) & 
operations 
(performance 
assessment). 
No.  No. OHSAS
18001 
 [Knowledg
e is not 
adequate] FSO for 
suppliers. 
Yes, but in 
one case 
only. 
Yes, a 
minority. 
Yes, 
conditions 
for foreign 
workers 
(hostels) 
Yes, FSO Yes, do 
somethin
g about 
global 
warming. 
C Same as 
industry 
Policies, 
operations. 
Yes         Yes No Yes No No Yes, comply
with env. & 
employees 
safety 
 No Do not
know 
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Table 3 (continued): Company CSR activities, organisation and performance 
Upgrading of CSR Integration of CSR in 
daily routines #) 
Firm 
cases 
CSR 
challenges 
faced by DC 
firm 
(Q 11) 
Company’s 
integration of 
CSR issues in its 
organisation 
(Q 17) 
Env. 
Q 18 
Social 
Q 19 
CSR 
standards 
achieved 
(Q 7) 
CSR 
capability 
(Q 30) 
CSR 
support 
from 
customer 
(Q 13) 
Forced by 
customers or 
compe-titors
( Q 12)
Own 
initiatives 
(Q 15) 
Demands 
on firm’s 
suppliers 
(Q 16)
Plans for 
next 
year 
(Q 23) 
D 
 
Same as 
industry 
Policies     Yes, safety
& health of 
employees. 
Safety, 
health, env. 
meeting 
each month 
 Yes, HR 
meeting 
every two 
months 
No Yes Yes,
technical 
support 
Yes, ISO 
9000 [? This 
is not a CSR 
standard] 
Do not 
know 
No Yes,
OHS 
issue, no 
specific 
plans 
disclosed
. 
E No CSR 
challenges.  
OHS committee,  
Annual report 
(ACCA MESRA, 
no triple bottom 
line) 
Campaign 
(MAT) 
No No       ISO
14001, 
OHSAS 
18001. 
Yes, with 
the current 
people. 
Yet 
depends 
on 
severity. 
Governme
nt which is 
also 
largest 
customer 
No. Yes.
(employ 
disabled 
people, jfr. 
Q 11). 
No. Yes, the
Silver 
Book. 
F Particular 
challenges 
(employee 
awareness, 
capital exp. to 
ROHS, EU 
directive) 
Mission (after 
philosophy of 
Daikin, Japan). 
Strategy 
(balanced score 
card strategy 
map). 
Yes (air 
discharge, 
noise level) 
No. ISO 14001
under 
audit 
 Yes, firm 
has its 
specific 
personnel 
to deal 
with the 
issues. 
Yes, 
technical 
& training 
support, no 
financial 
support. 
ROHS 
[technical 
standard of 
EUC]. 
Yes, ISO 
14001 
Yes, 
mandatory 
to comply 
with ROHS 
Yes,  
ISO 
14001 
[finalise 
the 
certificati
on] 
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Table 3 (continued): Company CSR activities, organisation and performance 
Upgrading of CSR Integration of CSR in 
daily routines #) 
Firm 
cases 
CSR 
challenges 
faced by DC 
firm 
(Q 11) 
Company’s 
integration of 
CSR issues in its 
organisation 
(Q 17) 
Env. 
Q 18 
Social 
Q 19 
CSR 
standards 
achieved 
(Q 7) 
CSR 
capability 
(Q 30) 
CSR 
support 
from 
customer 
(Q 13) 
 
Forced by 
customers or 
compe-titors
( Q 12) 
Own 
initiatives 
(Q 15) 
Demands 
on firm’s 
suppliers 
(Q 16) 
Plans for 
next 
year 
(Q 23) 
G Employ foreign 
labour 
Committees for 
OHS, env., 
welfare, JCC, in-
house unions 
[In annual 
report] 
[In annual 
report] 
OHSAS 
18001 part 
of TS 
16949 end 
of year 
Yes, but 
use 
external 
consultants 
to train 
own 
trainers. 
Yes, in-
house 
training, 
out-house 
in one 
OEM.  
Not yet. Yes, sport 
clubs, 
inhouse 
clinics, 
subsidized 
lunch, staff 
trips. 
Push them 
to comply 
with ISO 
14001 for 
critical 
items, ISO 
9000 for the 
rest. 
Plan to 
report on 
CSR 
(cost 
reduction 
perspecti
ve). 
H 
 
Bio fuel  Policies In annual 
report 
In annual 
report 
ISO 
14001, 
OHSAS 
18001 
(also 
TS 16949).
Yes, if we 
get more 
budget. 
Yes, OEM 
support 
Yes, 
indirectly, 
OEM has 
their own way 
for charity 
Yes, charity 
program, 
support to 
local school 
(music, 
scholarships
) 
No, so far. Silver 
Book 
I Same as 
industry 
Strategy        Yes, safety
measures, 
20% foreign 
workers, on-
the-job 
training 
 No TS 16949 Yes. No. No No No No
specific 
plan yet 
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Table 4: Company CSR performance and the business and societal context 
Upgrading of CSR CSR problems in industry/sector & 
solutions 
CSR problems of DC firm and stakeholder 
collaboration (except customer) 
Firm 
cases 
Industry/ 
sector CSR 
problems 
(Q 10) 
Instance of 
CSR crisis 
in 
industry/se
ctor 
(Q 25) 
CSR best 
practices 
in 
industry/ 
sector 
(Q 24) 
CSR 
challenges 
facing the 
recipient 
firm 
(Q 11) 
CSR support 
from other 
stakeholders 
than 
customers 
(Q 14) 
Third party 
certification 
of CSR 
(Q 21) 
 
 
CSR 
standards 
achieved 
(Q 7) 
CSR 
capabi-
lity 
(Q 30) 
Forced by 
customers 
or compe-
titors 
(Q 12) 
Own 
initia-
tives 
(Q 15) 
Demands 
on firm’s 
suppliers 
(Q 16) 
Plans 
for 
next 
year 
(Q 23) 
A Environment
al, heavy 
water use 
No      No best
practice 
 Same 
challenges 
Yes, ACCA 
& two others 
(Diageo, 
APB) 
No ISO 9001:2000 Yes
HACCP 
No Yes,  No Yes
B Environment
al, OHS; do 
not know 
industry 
[Do not 
know] 
IKEA 
(Sweedish 
firm) 
Lack of 
labour 
No (GO 
handle labour 
immigration) 
FSO      ISO 9001,
OHSAS 18001, 
FSO for 
suppliers 
Do not 
know 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
C Environment
al, 
OHS 
No         Sime
Darby, IOI
Same 
challenges 
No No. ISO 9000 Yes. No Yes No Do not
know 
D Environment
al, 
[HRD] 
Do not 
know 
No ‘best 
practice’ 
Same 
challenges 
No Yes, SIRIM ISO 9000:2001 Yes Yes Do not 
know 
No  Yes
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Table 4 (continued): Company CSR performance and the business and societal context 
Upgrading of CSR CSR problems in industry/sector & 
solutions 
CSR problems of DC firm and stakeholder 
collaboration (except customer) 
Firm 
cases 
Industry/ 
sector CSR 
problems 
(Q 10) 
Instance of 
CSR crisis 
in 
industry/se
ctor 
(Q 25) 
CSR best 
practices 
in 
industry/ 
sector 
(Q 24) 
CSR 
challenges 
facing the 
recipient 
firm 
(Q 11) 
CSR support 
from other 
stakeholders 
than 
customers 
(Q 14) 
Third party 
certification 
of CSR 
(Q 21) 
 
 
CSR 
standards 
achieved 
(Q 7) 
CSR 
capabi-
lity 
(Q 30) 
Forced by 
customers 
or compe-
titors 
(Q 12) 
Own 
initia-
tives 
(Q 15) 
Demands 
on firm’s 
suppliers 
(Q 16) 
Plans 
for 
next 
year 
(Q 23) 
E Not much 
challenge 
No, 
Malaysian 
consumers 
still naïve. 
No locals 
with ‘best 
practice’, 
MNCs 
different 
No challenges No No. “Are 
there such 
companies 
here?” [do not 
know Novo 
Nordic] 
ISO 9001, ISO 
14001, 
OHSAS 18001 
BS 7799 (IT) 
ISO 17025 
(lab). 
Yes, 
with the 
current 
people. 
Depend
s on 
severity
. 
No    Yes No Yes
F Needs of 
community 
[environmen
t] 
No      Yes,
Daikin 
Japan 
Particular 
challenges: 
employees 
awareness, 
capital exp. to 
ROHS, EUC 
directive 
No Yes, SIRIM ISO 9000. ISO 
14001 under 
certification 
Yes, 
firm has 
its 
specific 
personn
el to 
deal 
with the 
issues 
Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4 (continued): Company CSR performance and the business and societal context 
Upgrading of CSR CSR problems in industry/sector & 
solutions 
CSR problems of DC firm and stakeholder 
collaboration (except customer) 
Firm 
cases 
Industry/ 
sector CSR 
problems 
(Q 10) 
Instance of 
CSR crisis 
in 
industry/se
ctor 
(Q 25) 
 
CSR best 
practices 
in 
industry/ 
sector 
(Q 24) 
CSR 
challenges 
facing the 
recipient 
firm 
(Q 11) 
CSR support 
from other 
stakeholders 
than 
customers 
(Q 14) 
Third party 
certification 
of CSR 
(Q 21) 
 
 
CSR 
standards 
achieved 
(Q 7) 
CSR 
capabi-
lity 
(Q 30) 
Forced by 
customers 
or compe-
titors 
(Q 12) 
Own 
initia-
tives 
(Q 15) 
Demands 
on firm’s 
suppliers 
(Q 16) 
Plans 
for 
next 
year 
(Q 23) 
G Environ-
mental 
No     Toyota,
maybe 
Perodua 
 Foreign 
labour 
Not recently. 
Long time 
ago World 
Bank env. 
friendly 
machinery 
Yes , for ISO 
certification 
TS 16949 by 
end of year 
(incl. OHSAS 
18001). 
Yes, 
use 
consul-
tancy 
support 
for 
training 
our 
trainers.
No Yes Yes Yes
H Upcoming 
with Siver 
Book 
No     Toyota,
Perodua 
 Particular 
challenge: Bio 
fuel 
Yes, 
Government 
& Toyota 
No. ISO 9000, ISO 
14001, OHSAS 
18001, 
TS 16949 in 
process 
Yes, if 
we get 
more 
budget. 
Yes Yes No Yes
I Environment
al, OHS 
N.a.        No ‘best
practice’ 
 Same as 
industry 
No No ISO 9000, Yes
TS 16949 
No No No No
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